Chiefdom Shading Key:

	No violations reported (in statements to the TRC)
	Less than 25 violations reported
	25 or more violations reported

Note: Chiefdoms are shaded according to the number of violations recorded in the TRC's statements. Unreported violations may have occurred in chiefdoms where none are shown. Also the reporting of violations within a chiefdom does not imply that the abuse occurred at a particular location within that chiefdom. Outliers are excluded where evidence supports this decision. See the methodology for further explanation.

The RUF/NPFL Power Struggle

Battalions of Charles Taylor's NPFL had led the initial invasion. Starting in Pendembu in August, the Sierra Leonean members of the RUF turned on their supposed comrades from Liberia. The fight gathered momentum, spreading to Kailahun Town, Buedu and then Koindu. The NPFL fighters faced a stark choice, risking death at the hands of their former RUF allies or fleeing back to Liberia.

The seeds of this power struggle were sown in the first days of the conflict. Lacking any interest in Sankoh's revolutionary plans, many NPFL fighters had focussed on looting and profiteering from the outset. Their increasing brutality towards the local population contributed to the RUF's failure to find popular support for their 'revolution'. By April 1992 the NPFL contingent were trying to take control of the war by assassinating the RUF leadership. Beginning with the 'Top 20' campaign to execute the administrative officers of the RUF, this was followed by the 'Top 40' campaign to target the RUF's military commanders. Many of the RUF's senior leaders were killed.

As the NPFL fighters ran out of ammunition the Sierra Leonean contingent of the RUF retaliated. The fighting that began in Pendembu was 'Top Final', a campaign to expel the NPFL fighters from the country. Thereafter the direct involvement of Liberian fighters in the conflict would be greatly reduced. This is supported by the TRC's statements, reporting Liberian participation in around 80% of RUF incidents in 1991 but declining to just 21% in 1993. The RUF force that went on to attack Kono at the end of the year would be a primarily Sierra Leonean enterprise.

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See the TRC report chapter The Military and Political History of the Conflict for more on this topic (from paragraph 347).