Chiefdom Shading Key:

	No violations reported (in statements to the TRC)
	Less than 25 violations reported
	25 or more violations reported

Note: Chiefdoms are shaded according to the number of violations recorded in the TRC's statements. Unreported violations may have occurred in chiefdoms where none are shown. Also the reporting of violations within a chiefdom does not imply that the abuse occurred at a particular location within that chiefdom. Outliers are excluded where evidence supports this decision. See the methodology for further explanation.

The Fight for Daru

At the start of the war the army was in a terrible state. The Sierra Leone Army (SLA) had only a few thousand troops, many of whom were deployed on a peacekeeping mission abroad. Soldiers had received only limited training and even fundamentals like rifles were in short supply. The army's officers were often involved in corrupt schemes or owed their position to factional loyalties rather than the ability to lead.

Though combating the RUF should have been the job of the army alone, within weeks of the Bomaru attack other forces were called upon to help. The SLA fought alongside Guinean troops, the elite police Special Security Division (SSD) and disaffected Liberians. In May five senior army officers were dismissed because they could not control their troops. Despite these difficult beginnings, by June it was reported that the army had stopped the rebel advance and were pushing the RUF out of areas they had previously occupied.

Meanwhile, the RUF had focused on capturing towns and villages and declaring them 'liberated'. Whilst they were forced to retreat from districts to the West, wresting control of the Moa barracks from the army would help to secure their position in Kailahun. The barracks are located in Daru; a victory here for the RUF would effectively expel the army from the East of the country.

At the start of the battle the army, bolstered by the Guinean Armed Forces, was in its barracks on the west side of the Moa river. On the other side, approaching from Daru, were around 1000 RUF and NPFL fighters armed with light weapons and grenades. The RUF's rifles were no match for the heavy artillery of the army, so they were unable to seize the barracks. This failure at Daru was an early indication that the strategy of targeting towns and capturing territory could not be sustained.

Proceed to 1992 or follow the Zimmi link for an explanation of the difficulties the RUF faced in trying to inspire popular support.

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The battle at Daru is described in more detail in the TRC report chapter The Military and Political History of the Conflict (from paragraph 221 on the battle and from paragraph 243 on the army's deficiencies)